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NOTE
Dog Process or Due Pupcess? Federal Court
Misses Opportunity to Modernize Pet Due
Process Jurisprudence
Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 2019).
Grace Hambuchen*

I. INTRODUCTION
Nicknames such as Boo Bear, Snookums, Sweet Precious Baby, or
Cutie Patootie fondly show how owners might typically interact with their
pets.1 With Americans spending approximately $95.7 billion on pets in
2019,2 the Uniform Trust Code expressly allowing trusts to care for
deceased owners’ pets,3 and the COVID-19 pandemic bringing a sharp
increase in dog adoptions,4 pets are becoming an ever more significant part
of the American family. When a pet escapes or goes missing, most owners

*

B.A., Saint Louis University, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of
Law, 2022; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2021-2022. I am grateful to
Professor Wilson Freyermuth for his kindness, brilliance, and support during the
writing of this Note, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing
process.
1
Third person plural pronouns are used in place of third person singular
pronouns.
2
Americans’ Pet Spending Reaches Record-Breaking High: $95.7 Billion, AM.
PET
PRODS.
ASS’N
(Feb.
27,
2020),
https://www.americanpetproducts.org/press_releasedetail.asp?id=205
[https://perma.cc/3PPM-WAA5].
3
UNIF. TR. CODE § 408.
4
Kim Kavin, Dog adoptions and sales soar during the pandemic, WASH. POST
(Aug.
12,
2020,
8:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/08/12/adoptions-dogs-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/BFF3-PF3A].
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desperately want them to return home safely;5 microchipping is one
proactive, reliable option for owners to help ensure they do.6
Additionally, local municipalities recognize the potential microchips
offer to quickly find lost pets,7 and accordingly, frequently require citizens
to microchip their pets.8 However, according to Lunon v. Botsford, a
recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,
procedural due process does not require an animal control officer to scan
an impounded dog for a microchip, even where a microchip scanner is
readily available.9 This Note reveals the alarming ease with which an
owner’s protected property interest in their pet can be extinguished and
how the court’s decision works against the local government interest in
efficiently identifying owners of stray animals and keeping stray animal
populations under control. Moreover, it argues that the court missed an
opportunity to modernize due-process jurisprudence and the law
governing pet owners’ property interests in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Flowers.10
Part II of this Note explores the facts and holding of Lunon. Part III
provides background on due process generally and the relationship
between due process and animals. Part IV then discusses the Eighth
Circuit’s majority opinion and concurring opinions. Finally, the Part V
reviews the impact the present holding has on pet owners’ due process
5
See, e.g., Emily Caldwell, Microchips Result in Higher Rate of Return of
Shelter Animals to Owners, OHIO STATE NEWS (Oct. 11, 2009),
https://news.osu.edu/microchips-result-in-higher-rate-of-return-of-shelter-animalsto-owners/ [https://perma.cc/5U48-29V7].
6
See, e.g., Liz Donovan, Three Reasons to Microchip Your Dog, AM. KENNEL
CLUB (June 8, 2015), https://www.akc.org/expert-advice/health/three-reasons-tomicrochip-yourdog/#:~:text=Unlike%20a%20collar%2C%20which%20can,your%20pet%20goes%
20missing%20here [https://perma.cc/QL67-7JFA]; Tod Gill, Fayetteville’s pet
microchip law goes into effect in January 2012, FAYETTEVILLE FLYER (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/2011/12/07/fayettevilles-pet-microchip-law-goesinto-effect-in-january-2012/ [https://perma.cc/2DTS-ZS6S].
7
See Chastity Dillard, Microchipping pets save lives and reduce taxpayer’s
cost,
DAILY
IOWAN
(May
8,
2012),
https://dailyiowan.com/2012/05/08/microchipping-pets-save-lives-and-reducetaxpayers-cost/ [https://perma.cc/2FBU-RNBV] (explaining the less time a pet spends
in a shelter, the less money it costs the taxpayer to take care of the lost animal).
Microchips are tiny, rice-sized transponders placed under the skin of the pet, which
store a unique ID number that can be used to quickly retrieve a pet owner’s contact
information.
See How do Pet Microchips Work?, PETFINDER,
https://www.petfinder.com/dogs/lost-and-found-dogs/how-pet-microchips-work/
[https://perma.cc/6LJ8-H553] (last visited Aug. 9, 2021). Microchips are used as a
second chance to identify a lost pet whose collar might also be missing. Id.
8
See, e.g., Gill, supra note 6.
9
Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 431 (8th Cir. 2019).
10
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 220 (2006).
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rights concerning their pets and on local governments’ interest in
microchipping pets in their jurisdictions.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 2016, Darryl Lunon purchased a purebred female German
Shephard and named her Bibi Von Sonenberg (“Bibi”).11 Lunon’s vet
implanted a microchip with a unique identifying number in Bibi and
placed a tattoo of the same identifying number in her ear.12 Bibi also had
a tag on her collar listing her name, Lunon’s address, and Lunon’s
telephone number.13 Lunon purchased Bibi not only as a companion but
also to breed her and sell purebred German Shephard puppies.14
Bibi ran from Lunon’s backyard in central Arkansas on February 14,
2017, after being spooked by a thunderstorm.15 The same day, when
Lunon discovered Bibi had escaped, he immediately began looking for
her.16 Lunon searched his neighborhood, spoke with neighbors, posted
flyers, posted on social media, and requested a national, regional, and local
search using Bibi’s microchip information.17
On February 15, 2017, Lunon’s neighbor, Will Quinn, discovered
Bibi in his garage.18 Quinn called the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office and,
eventually, Pulaski County Sanitation and Animal Services (“PCAS”)
dispatched the only animal control officer on duty that day, Officer
Jonathan Dupree.19 Dupree captured Bibi without incident and noted she
had a collar, but he could not locate an identifying tag.20 Dupree then took

11
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 427; The Brief of the Appellee at 5, Lunon, 946 F.3d 425
(No. 18-3314).
12
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 5.
13
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 5–6. It is disputed whether or not
Bibi had a collar when Animal Control detained her. The Brief of Appellants Botsford
and Dupree at 2, Lunon, 946 F.3d 425 (No. 18-3314).
14
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 5.
15
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 427–28; Linda Satter, Court overturns lost-dog ruling as
federal judges reject central Arkansas owner’s claim, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE
(Dec. 29, 2019, 9:12 AM), https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/dec/29/courtoverturns-lost-dog-ruling-2019122/ [https://perma.cc/F6T2-WGYP].
16
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 8; Appellants’ Brief of
Defendant-Appellants Botsford and Dupree at 3, Lunon, 946 F.3d 425 (No. 18-3314).
17
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 8.
18
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 428.
19
Id.
20
Id. In a footnote, the court accepts Lunon’s testimony regarding Bibi having
a tag in compliance with the county ordinance, but notes it is undisputed that Dupree
did not see a tag. Id. at 428 n.1.
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Bibi to the North Little Rock Animal Shelter (“NLRAS”), which contracts
with Pulaski County to accept stray dogs.21
PCAS Procedure provides:
It shall be the responsibility of the Animal Service Officer who brings
an animal into the North Little Rock Animal Shelter to make a kennel
card for the animal. It shall also be the responsibility of this person to
scan the animal for an implanted microchip and note it on the kennel
card. All animals should be scanned [unless dangerous]. The
Microchip Scanner is located above the work table in the kennel and
must be returned there after each use!22

Dupree did not scan Bibi for a microchip, nor did he correctly
complete Bibi’s kennel card.23 Dupree left the space for microchip
information blank and incorrectly listed Bibi as “male/not sterilized.” 24
PCAS policy and a Pulaski County ordinance require PCAS officials to
notify the known owner of a captured animal within forty-eight hours of
impoundment.25 However, because Dupree did not find an identifying tag
and failed to scan Bibi, he did not discover that Lunon was Bibi’s owner.26
On February 17, 2017, Lunon called PCAS and other officials in
North Little Rock to ask whether any officers had seized Bibi or had
custody of her.27 The officials told Lunon they did not have any dogs with
the name Bibi or description similar to Bibi’s in the shelter.28
Additionally, Lunon shared Bibi’s description with local veterinarians and
asked them to look out for female German Shepherds and scan them for a
microchip.29 Per North Little Rock Municipal Code, “[i]f the owner of an
impounded dog fails or refuses to reclaim such dog within five days after
impoundment, the city animal shelter is hereby authorized to release such
dog to a person other than the owner upon the payment of required fees or
to humanely euthanize the dog.”30 After a five-day hold, NLRAS put Bibi

21

Id. at 428.
Id. (citing PULASKI COUNTY SANITATION AND ANIMAL SERVICES DEPT.
PROCEDURE P14-06).
23
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 428.
24
Id.; The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 13.
25
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 7–8; PULASKI CNTY., ARK., CODE
OF ORDINANCES, Ordinance No. 81-OR-27, art. 4, 6-23-81.
26
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 428.
27
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 8; Appellants’ Brief of
Defendant-Appellants Botsford and Dupree, supra note 16, at 3.
28
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 8.
29
Id.
30
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 428; NORTH LITTLE ROCK MUN. CODE § 3.1.7(B).
22
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up for adoption,31 and on February 24, 2017, Christopher Vance adopted
her.32 As required by the North Little Rock Animal Control, NLRAS
sterilized Bibi on February 28, 2017.33 Vance subsequently gave Bibi to
his mother-in-law, Deloris Lovell.34
On March 18, after Quinn saw Lunon’s signs for Bibi, he informed
Lunon he reported a stray dog in his garage and animal control had seized
it.35 Lunon went to the Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office and obtained a
copy of the report concerning the incident Quinn described.36 Lunon then
went to PCAS to find Bibi and discovered NLRAS had picked up Bibi but
subsequently adopted her out to a new owner.37
On June 19, 2017, Lunon filed a complaint against Vance, Lovell,
Pulaski County, and the City of North Little Rock in the Circuit Court of
Pulaski County.38 Lunon asserted claims of negligence for failure to
follow proper procedure and requested a writ of replevin directed at Vance
and Lovell for the return of Bibi.39 Judge Mary McGowan heard only the
replevin case and ordered Vance and Lovell to return Bibi to Lunon.40
Though Lunon was reunited with Bibi, PCAS and NLRAS had
deprived her of any economic value by spaying her. Lunon therefore
amended his complaint, adding claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of Lunon’s procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. These claims stemmed from PCAS Director Kathy

31

Lunon, 946 F.3d at 428.
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 10; Appellants’ Brief of
Defendant-Appellants Botsford and Dupree, supra note 16, at 3.
33
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 10.
34
Id.
35
Id. at 8–9; Appellants’ Brief of Defendant-Appellants Botsford and Dupree,
supra note 16, at 3–4; Separate Appellant David N. Miles, III’s Brief at 3, Lunon, 946
F.3d 425 (No. 18-3314).
36
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 9.
37
Id.; Appellants’ Brief of Defendant-Appellants Botsford and Dupree, supra
note 16, at 3–4
38
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 10. “Lunon also named PCAS;
Kathy Botsford, the Director of PCAS, in her official capacity; Dupree in his official
capacity; North Little Rock Animal Control; and Miles in his official capacity as the
Director of North Little Rock Animal Control.” Id. at n.4.
39
Id. at 11. A writ of replevin is “[a]n action seeking return of personal property
wrongfully taken or held by the defendant. Rules on replevin actions vary by
jurisdiction.”
Replevin, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/replevin
[https://perma.cc/89RU-Y87G]
(last
visited Apr. 13, 2021). Before this state court hearing, Lunon amended his complaint
to add Pulaski County and North Little Rock as parties asserting that each violated his
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment when Bibi was seized, sterilized,
and adopted without notifying Lunon. The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at
12.
40
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 17.
32
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Botsford’s and North Little Rock Animal Control Director David Miles’s
alleged failure to train persons under their supervision concerning proper
intake procedure, which required microchip scanning and owner
notification.41 Lunon also claimed the inadequate training caused to
Dupree to deliberately disregard these procedures, inevitably leading to
Bibi’s sterilization and subsequent adoption.42 Finally, Lunon alleged
Defendants perpetuated a policy of routinely disregarding local ordinances
and rules requiring animal services officers to scan every impounded pet
for a microchip.43
Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Arkansas, where Dupree, Botsford, and Miles, filed
a motion for summary judgment, arguing they were entitled to qualified
immunity from Lunon’s claims against them in their individual
capcaities.44 The District Court denied the motion, finding genuine issues
of material fact and holding that the defendants were not entitled to
qualified immunity.45 Defendants then filed an interlocutory appeal.46
The Court of Appeals held a shelter is not constitutionally required
to affirmatively provide notice to an owner when “an animal shelter holds
a stray dog for more than five days and then adopts out and spays the dog
after the owner fails to file a claim.”47 Because there was no procedural
due-process violation, the court held that each defendant was entitled to
qualified immunity as a matter of law.48

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While the court may have ultimately decided this case on qualified
immunity grounds, it serves as a thought-provoking example of modern
due process jurisprudence — specifically, the relationship between due

41
Id. at 18. To clarify, the public entities named as defendants are Pulaski
County, PCAS, the City of North Little Rock, and North Little Rock Animal Control.
The individual defendants named in their official capacities are Animal Control
Officer Jonathan Dupree of the PCAS, PCAS Director Kathy Botsford, and City of
North Little Rock Animal Control Director David Miles. Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d
425, 427 (8th Cir. 2019).
42
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 18.
43
Id. at 34.
44
Id. at 19. It is important to note Dupree and Botsford filed a response
together, but Miles filed an independent response. Appellants’ Brief of DefendantAppellants Botsford and Dupree, supra note 16, at 8; Separate Appellant David N.
Miles, III’s Brief, supra note 35, at 9.
45
Lunon v. Vance, No. 4:17-CV-00623-BSM, 2018 WL 10127530, at *6 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 25, 2018), rev'd sub nom. Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 2019).
46
The Brief of the Appellee, supra note 11, at 21.
47
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 431.
48
Id. at 431–32.
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process and pets. This Part first provides a general explanation of the Due
Process Clause coupled with a discussion of property interests in pets.
Second, it explores a parallel due process case, Jones v. Flowers,
concerning notice of tax sales.49

A. The Due Process Clause & Pets
The Fourteenth Amendment contains a due process clause which
prohibits the state from depriving any “of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”50 This clause is interpreted to provide two types of
protection to U.S. citizens: substantive due process and procedural due
process.51 Substantive due process requires the government to have
sufficient justification before taking away a person’s life, liberty, or
property,52 while procedural due process concerns the process the
government must follow before doing so.53 Typically procedural due
process claims arise from disputes regarding the form of hearing or type
of notice the government must provide.54 In bringing a Section 1983
claim, the plaintiff must allege a government official deprived them of the
right to due process while following a law, statute, ordinance regulation,
custom or usage.55 Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has
consistently held that allegations of negligence cannot support procedural
due process claims;56 the due process guarantee only protects against
intentional acts by government officials.57
Procedural due process claims require analysis of two important
questions: First, was the plaintiff deprived of a constitutionally protected

49

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Note the Fifth Amendment also contains a
Due Process Clause with similar language. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
51
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
52
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 592
(6th ed. 2019).
53
Id. at 591. To see the difference, one may look to constitutional parental
rights to child custody. Id. at 592. For example, “procedural due process requires that
the government provide notice and a hearing, and that there be clear and convincing
evidence of a need to terminate custody, before parental rights are permanently ended.
Because the right to custody is deemed a fundamental right, substantive due process
requires that the government prove that terminating custody is necessary to achieve a
compelling purpose, such as the need to prevent abuse or neglect of the child.” Id.
54
Id. at 591. Because procedural due process is at issue here, substantive due
process will not be talked about further.
55
42 U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436
U.S. 658, 691–92 (1978).
56
See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 143 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
57
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
50
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interest in life, liberty, or property?58 Second, if yes, what process is due
concerning the deprivation?59 The Constitution does not create specific
property interests.60 However, there is no question that when the
government deprives an individual of real or personal property, due
process is implicated61 Generally, property interests are created and
defined by independent sources such as state law, which generate
entitlements to specific benefits.62
The judicial system has long held that animal owners have substantial
property interests in their domesticated pets, especially in their incomegenerating animals.63 Dog-breeding is recognized as a taxable, legitimate
source of income when breeders abide by the proper legal regulations.64
Moreover, states often codify an owner’s property interest in their dog.65
Under some state laws, courts have held that even owners of unlicensed
dogs retain a property interest in their dogs.66 However, a pet owner’s

58

Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Porter v.
Diblasio, 93 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1996)).
59
Id.
60
Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
61
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 591. For example, your home or land for
the building of an interstate. Id.
62
Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
63
Siebert, 256 F.3d at 660 (holding owner had substantial property interest in
horses); Porter, 93 F.3d at 306–07 (holding owner had substantial property interest in
horses); McSwain v. Vilsack, No. 1:16-CV-01234-RWS, 2016 WL 4150036, at *4
(N.D. Ga. May 25, 2016) (holding owner had substantial property interest in high-step
gait breeding horses); Daskalea v. Wash. Humane Soc’y, 480 F. Supp. 2d 16, 34
(D.D.C. 2007) (undisputed owner had protected property interest in dog purchased for
companionship and breeding); Temple v. Cleve Her Many Horses, 163 F. Supp. 3d
602, 624 (D.S.D. 2016) (owner had protected property interest in incoming-generating
cattle).
64
See, e.g., Dragonwood Conservancy, Inc. v. Felician, No. 16-CV-534, 2019
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99777, at *20 (holding claims of lost breeding rights are lost profits
and plaintiffs may recover for those damages); Glenye Cain Oakford, Tax Tips for
Dog Breeders, AM. KENNEL CLUB (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.akc.org/expertadvice/dog-breeding/tax-tips-for-dog-breeders/
[https://perma.cc/PUL8-HJDY]
(“One basic thing to remember is that, even if you breed dogs as a hobby, income you
make from that activity—e.g., when you sell a puppy—is taxable.”).
65
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-19-302(5)(A) (2021) (“‘Owner’ means any
person who: Has a right of property in a dog, cat, or other animal…”); 3 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 459-102 (2021) (“When applied to the proprietorship of a dog, includes every
person having a right of property in such dog, and every person who keeps or harbors
such dog or has it in his care, and every person who permits such dog to remain on or
about any premises occupied by him.”).
66
Smith v. City of Detroit 751 F.App’x 691, 696 (6th Cir. 2018). Unlicensed
here just means the owner did not license the dog through the City. Id. at 692.
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“protected property interest wanes” but is not extinguished if their pet
escapes.67
Where a protected property interest exists, a determination must be
made about what process is due before the government deprives a citizen
of that interest.68 In general, courts consistently hold “some form of
hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property
interest.”69 Due process pre-deprivation hearings, where feasible, apply to
temporary deprivations and permanent deprivations.70 The modern test
used to determine what process is required comes from Mathews v.
Eldridge.71 The Mathews test requires balancing three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.72

Courts have broad discretion in applying the Mathews test, including
in cases involving animals.73 In Porter v. DiBlasio, the court held the
government must provide owners proper notice and an opportunity to be
heard before permanently terminating the owner’s interest in an animal.74
In Porter, Porter’s nine thoroughbred racehorses were in the care of
another when the county seized all of the horses present at that individual’s

67
Hansen v. Black, 872 F.3d 554, 559 (8th Cir. 2017); see also Altman v. City
of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 205–06 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Put simply, while we do not
denigrate the possessory interest a dog owner has in his pet, we do conclude that dog
owners forfeit many of these possessory interests when they allow their dogs to run at
large, unleashed, uncontrolled, and unsupervised, for at that point the dog ceases to
become simply a personal effect and takes on the nature of a public nuisance.”).
68
Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Porter v.
DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir. 1996)).
69
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974)); see also Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 305 (7th Cir.
1996) (“The presumption is that an individual is entitled to notice and an opportunity
for a hearing prior to the state's permanent deprivation of his property interest.”).
70
Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158, 1162 (7th Cir.
1992).
71
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
72
Id. at 335.
73
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 630; see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. V.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 562 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The balance is
simply an ad hoc weighing which depends to a great extent upon how the Court
subjectively vies the underlying interests at stake.”).
74
Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1996).
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farm.75 Though the county knew of Porter’s ownership interest in the
horses, it did not notify Porter that it would treat his horses as strays,
putting them up for adoption after a five-day holding period. 76 Applying
the Mathews factors, the court first determined it was undisputed that an
individual has a substantial interest in maintaining ownership of their
animals, particularly “potential income-generating animals.”77 Second,
the court noted the high risk an owner faces of permanent and wrongful
deprivation of rights under a brief five-day redemption period.78 Notice to
the owner and a hearing would allow the owner to challenge the legality
of the original animal seizure and the costs incurred as a result of it. 79
Third, requiring notice and a hearing before terminating a known owner’s
interest in their animals would not significantly burden the government
because there is already a five-day redemption period in which a hearing
could be held.80
In O’Keefe v. Gist, a police officer responded to a report of a stray
81
dog. The officer picked up the dog and determined it had no identifiable
owner due to its lack of a collar.82 The officer did not check the dog for a
microchip, which it had, because the officer did not have a scanner readily
available.83 The court held procedural due process does not require
municipal or state officials to scan a stray dog for a microchip where no
microchip scanner is readily available.84 Visually inspecting the dog to
determine it was a stray and that the owner was unknown was sufficient to
meet due process requirements considering the owner received an
effective post-deprivation remedy of reclaiming his dog.85 Using the
Mathews factors,86 the court first determined the officer lawfully and
properly took possession of the dog as a stray. 87 Second, the court noted

75

Id.
Id. at 303–04.
77
Id. at 306–07. The court also emphasizes “[o]ther types of animals more
commonly kept as pets have a different, but not necessarily lesser, value to their
owners, generally in the form of companionship.” Id.
78
Id. at 307.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
O'Keefe v. Gist, 908 F. Supp. 2d 946, 956 (C.D. Ill. 2012).
82
Id.
83
Id. at 956–57.
84
Id. at 962.
85
Id.
86
The court in O’Keefe ultimately determined the police officer, who gave the
dog to the individual at the police station instead of taking it to the pound to be
processed and held for the waiting period, acted randomly and without authorization.
Id. at 959–60. Thus, the post-deprivation remedies were sufficient to meet due process
requirements. Id.
87
Id. at 961.
76

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss4/9

10

Hambuchen: Dog Process or Due Pupcess? Federal Court Misses Opportunity to M

2021]

PET DUE PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE

1343

pre-deprivation procedures were not feasible in this situation because the
officer could not, through visual inspection, determine the dog’s owner
before the officer seized the dog.88 Moreover, the post-deprivation
remedies were sufficient to provide due process to the dog’s owner
because the owner reclaimed the dog through a replevin hearing.89 Third,
the administrative and fiscal burden “requiring all municipalities to scan
every stray cat and dog for microchips would outweigh the burden
imposed on pet owners either to put identification tags on the animals or
to use post-deprivation procedures to recover lost pets.”90
As stressed in O’Keefe, despite the presumption that an individual is
entitled to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before
governmental deprivation of a property right, a pre-deprivation hearing is
not required in all circumstances.91 Due process only requires “such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”92 For
example, a remedy in common-law-tort or a post-deprivation hearing may
satisfy due process.93

B. Jones v. Flowers
Due process jurisprudence has evolved to require more of the State
before depriving an individual of a protected property interest. In light of
society’s advancements in communication, in Jones v. Flowers, the
Supreme Court heightened the notice requirements the state must follow
before selling a property to satisfy a tax burden.94 In Jones, Gary Jones
moved from his long-time home on North Bryan Street in Little Rock,
Arkansas, to an apartment after his divorce.95 Jones’s ex-wife continued
to live in the home.96 Jones successfully paid off his mortgage in 1997 but
failed to pay property taxes, so the property was then certified as
delinquent.97 The Commissioner of State Lands (“Commissioner”)
“attempted to notify Jones of his tax delinquency and the State’s right to
redeem the property, by mailing a certified letter to Jones at the North
Bryan Street address.”98 No one was home to sign for the certified letter,
88

Id.
Id. at 961–62.
90
Id. at 962.
91
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982); O'Keefe, 908 F. Supp. 2d
at 951.
92
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976).
93
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990).
94
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 239 (2006).
95
Id. at 223.
96
Id.
97
Id. (“Jones paid his mortgage each month for [thirty] years, and the mortgage
company paid Jones’ property taxes.”).
98
Id.
89
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and no one went to the post office to retrieve the letter within the fifteenday holding period.99 The post office then returned the unopened letter to
the Commissioner, labeling it as unclaimed.100 Two years passed, and
before the public sale of the property, “the Commissioner published a
notice of public sale in the Arkansas Democrat Gazette.” 101 The
Commissioner sent an additional notice to Jones at the North Bryan Street
address, but the letter was returned again, labeled as unclaimed.102 The
Commissioner subsequently sold the property to Linda Flowers, delivered
an unlawful detainer notice to the property, and served notice on Jones’
daughter, who then contacted Jones to notify him of the tax sale.103 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine “whether the Due Process
Clause requires the government to take additional reasonable steps to
notify a property owner when notice of a tax sale is returned
undelivered.”104 The Court held “the State should have taken additional
reasonable steps to notify Jones, if practicable to do so” because a person
“desirous of actually informing” an individual of an impending tax sale of
a house “would [not] do nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner
is returned unclaimed.”105
The Court determined there were several reasonable steps the State
could have taken to notify Jones.106 For example, the State could have sent
the notice by regular mail, so no signature was required, potentially
allowing the new resident of the house to notify the postman of the
previous owner’s new address or notify the prior owner directly.107 The
Court also said the State could have posted a notice on the front door or
addressed the undeliverable mail to “occupant,” increasing the likelihood
the present occupant would read the notice and alert the owner.108 Thus,
considering the options the state has to notify an individual, the state must
do more to try and inform an owner of the potential deprivation of their

99

Id. at 223–24.
Id. at 224.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 225.
105
Id. at 221, 229, 234 (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950).
106
Id. at 234.
107
Id. at 234–35.
108
Id. at 235. The Court presumes the present occupant will notify the owner
because the notice affects their current property interest in the property as well. Id.
The Court also notes “[f]ollowing up by publication was not constitutionally adequate
under the circumstances presented here because, as [the Court has] explained, it was
possible and practicable to give Jones more adequate warning of the impending tax
sale.” Id. at 237.
100
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property when a notice letter is returned unclaimed.109 The Court did not
hesitate to modernize notice requirements in light of society’s
contemporary norms of communication. This implies that advancements
in technology to identify a lost pet’s owners may also require the state to
do “a bit more.”

IV. INSTANT DECISION
There are two ultimate issues in this case: First, whether Lunon had
a procedural due process right to affirmative pre-deprivation notice before
the state interfered with his property interest in Bibi by spaying her and
adopting her out;110 and second, whether Dupree, Botsford, or Miles, in
their individual or official capacities, violated this right.111

A. Majority Opinion
The Majority resolved these issues by first explaining the rules
surrounding qualified immunity. 112 Next, the court discussed whether
Lunon had a protected constitutional due process right that the state
violated.113 Finally, the court determined whether Defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity.114
The Majority explained, “[q]ualified immunity shields public
officials from liability for civil damages if their conduct does not ‘violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.’”115 To defeat a summary judgment motion
based on qualified immunity, Lunon was required to show that “the
individual defendants acting in their individual capacities violated a
constitutional or statutory right that was clearly established at the time of
the violation.”116
The court noted the purpose of the Due Process Clause is to restrict
“governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or
‘property’ interests.”117 The Majority explained property interests “are
created, and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law –
rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims

109

Id. at 239.
Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 427 (8th Cir. 2019).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 432.
115
Id. at 429 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
116
Id. (citing Hansen v. Black, 872 F.3d 554, 557–58 (8th Cir. 2017).
117
Id. (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976)).
110
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of entitlement to those benefits.”118 With this formula, the Majority
focused on determining whether Lunon had a protected right to procedural
due process before his property interest, in Bibi, was infringed.119
The Majority laid out century-old Supreme Court precedent to
explain how the law considers property interests in dogs generally.120
Despite assuming dogs are property, dogs are “still be subject to the police
power of the state, and might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with” without
divesting the dog’s owner of any federal right, “as in judgment of the
legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens.”121 Additionally,
the Majority discussed Arkansas law concerning livestock and due
process.122 The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Howell v. Daughet held
“under the police power there can be a summary seizure and sale of
trespassing stock without personal service of notice on the owner, and
without any kind of judicial proceedings” without violating any rights
related to the seizure and sale of property.123 Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas also held five days’ notice via public posting was
sufficient to satisfy due process where an owner’s swine escaped, were
impounded, and then sold. 124 The Majority noted the protected property
interest of a dog owner “wanes if his pet escapes” and is allowed to run
“unleashed, uncontrolled, and unsupervised,” becoming “a public
nuisance.”125
The Majority ultimately applied the aforementioned law to determine
whether Lunon had a protected right to procedural due process before his
property interest was infringed.126 Lunon claimed defendants “violated his
procedural due process right to affirmative notice before Bibi was adopted
out and spayed.”127 However, the Arkansas case law in Howell and
Dodson rejected this claimed procedural right.128 Thus, if those decisions
defined “the dimensions of Lunon’s procedural due process property
interest . . . then he has no due process claim.”129 The Majority concluded,
118

Id. (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Id.
120
Id. at 430.
121
Id. (quoting Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 704 (1897)).
122
Id.
123
230 S.W. 559, 560 (Ark. 1921).
124
Fort Smith v. Dodson, 46 Ark. 296, 298–99 (1885).
125
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 430 (first quoting Hansen v. Black, 872 F.3d 554 (8th
Cir. 2017); then quoting Altman v. City of High Point, N.C., 330 F.3d 194, 206 (4th
Cir. 2003)).
126
Id. at 431.
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. (The Majority also notes however “[i]f those decisions are instead viewed
as declaring ‘what process is due,’ that is a federal question so they are not controlling
precedents.”).
119
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following other court decisions, pre-deprivation notice is not
constitutionally required where a stray dog is held for more than five days
by an animal shelter, and then after the owner fails to file a claim, adopted
out and spayed.130
Next, the court analyzed whether each defendant’s conduct
individually violated Lunon’s right to procedural due process.131 Dupree
did not deprive Lunon of a protected property interest by collecting and
impounding a stray dog.132 Moreover, because there is “no constitutional
duty to scan a stray dog for a microchip,” and officials do not lose qualified
immunity merely for violating an administrative or statutory provision,
Dupree’s failure to scan Bibi [] did not deprive Lunon of procedural due
process.133 The court held that Botsford and Miles were also entitled to
qualified immunity because not only did they not participate in Bibi’s
initial intake, adoption, or sterilization, but no subordinate violated
Lunon’s constitutional rights.134

B. Concurring Opinion
The Concurrence agreed with the court that Dupree, Botsford, and
Miles were entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate any
of Lunon’s clearly established rights.135 Specifically, the Concurrence
agreed there was no precedent supporting Lunon’s claim he was entitled
to pre-deprivation notice before Bibi was sterilized and placed up for
adoption.136 However, the Concurrence suggested Lunon may have had a
stronger claim than other similarly situated plaintiffs.137
The Concurrence differed from the Majority concerning “whether
Lunon presented sufficient evidence to support a due process claim against
one or more of the defendants under the framework of Mathews v.
Eldridge.”138 Even though Lunon’s private interest was weakened by the

130

Id.; see Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 214 (2d Cir. 2012); Wall v. City
of Brookfield, 406 F.3d 458, 459–60 (7th Cir. 2005); O’Keefe v. Gist, 908 F. Supp.2d
946, 952–53 (C.D. Ill. 2012); Lamare v. N. Country Animal League, 743 A.2d 598,
603 (1999); Jenkins v. City of Waxahachie, 392 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965).
131
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 431.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id. at 432. Lunon claimed Botsford was liable for violating his procedural
due process rights because she “instituted and enforced an established pattern of noncompliance” with the county directives concerning scanning strays for microchips and
giving notice to owners. Id. (quotations omitted).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 433; 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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fact Bibi escaped, the Mathews factors still provided him a strong claim:
there was a risk of erroneous deprivation, there was high value in scanning
a stray animal for a microchip to identify its potential owner, who could
then be notified, and the burden created by scanning for a microchip with
an already accessible scanner was small.139 The Concurrence went on to
criticize the Majority for citing the tired Arkansas cases Howell v. Daughet
and Fort Smith v. Dodson because each was decided long before the
Supreme Court “developed its modern due process jurisprudence, so they
are both non-binding and outdated.”140 Nonetheless, the Concurrence
agreed with the Majority regarding qualified immunity, resolving the
appeal.141

V. COMMENT
First, this comment addressees the uncertain legal analysis in Lunon
and the inadvertent precedent the decision created.142 Second, it examines
the Lunon precedent in conjunction with unbridled powers the state may
use to easily deprive a pet owner of their property interest. Third, this
comment analyzes the counterproductive effect this precedent has on
prevailing policies surrounding dog ownership and the owners themselves.
Finally, it discusses the missed opportunity to modernize due process
jurisprudence in relation to pets.

A. The Shortfalls and Impact of Lunon
As the Concurrence in Lunon properly alludes to, the Mathews test
should have been used to thoroughly discuss the constitutional due process
claim raised in this case.143 First, applying the Mathews test, it is clear
Lunon and dog owners generally have a protected property interest in the
ownership of their pets.144 This general interest applies whether the pet in
question is for companionship purposes or income-generating purposes.145
139

Lunon, 946 F.3d at 433.
Id. (first citing Howell v. Daughet, 230 S.W. 559 (1921); and then citing
Fort Smith v. Dodson, 46 Ark. 296 (1885)).
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 433.
144
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
145
Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 660 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding owner had
substantial property interest in horses); Porter v. DiBlasio, 93 F.3d 301, 306–7 (7th
Cir. 1996) (holding owner had substantial property interest in horses); McSwain v.
Vilsack, No. 1:16-CV-01234-RWS, 2016 WL 4150036, at *4 (N.D. Ga. May 25,
2016) (holding owner had substantial property interest in high-step gait breeding
horses); Daskalea v. Washington Humane Soc'y, 480 F. Supp. 2d 16, 34 (D.D.C. 2007)
(undisputed owner had protected property interest in dog purchased for
140
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The Majority in Lunon neglects this point.146 Instead, the Majority only
emphasizes century-old precedent stating that, even assuming dogs are
property, “they would still be subject to the police power of the state and
might be destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgment of the
legislature is necessary for the protection of its citizens.”147 The Majority
again cites more archaic precedent stating “property in dogs … may be
subjected to peculiar and drastic police regulations by the state without
depriving their owners of any federal right.”148 It would be unreasonable
to dispute the notion that animals in the community, under appropriate
circumstances, are subject to police power when public safety requires
drastic action.149 However, the Majority misses the point. The state has
the power to take action, but the reality of the issue in Lunon concerns the
balance between that police power and a pet owner’s protected property
interest in their animal. The Majority failed to take into account or even
acknowledge that modern due process jurisprudence recognizes a pet
owner has a property interest in their dog, despite and separate from the
police power to control animals in the community. 150 The two points are
allowed to exist in harmony: dog owners can have a property interest in
their pets, but the state can also, in appropriate circumstances, deprive
owners of that interest.
Regarding the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous
deprivation of a pet owner’s interest is high because officials customarily
ignore the requirement to scan impounded pets for microchips.151 If
officers fail to check a dog for a microchip, this situation will likely recur;
a microchipped dog is impounded, the owner not notified, and the animal
companionship and breeding); Temple v. Cleve Her Many Horses, 163 F. Supp. 3d
602, 624 (D.S.D. 2016) (owner had protected property interest in incoming-generating
cattle).
146
See, e.g., Lunon, 946 F.3d at 430.
147
Id. (quoting Sentell v. New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 704 (1897)).
148
Id. (quoting Nicchia v. People of State of New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230–31
(1920)).
149
See, e.g., Chloe Melas, 6-year-old boy praised by Anne Hathaway on social
media for saving little sister from dog attack, CNN (July 17, 2020, 11:24 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/15/entertainment/little-boy-saves-sister-dog-attackanne-hathaway-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/N6VX-LV2H].
150
Siebert, 256 F.3d at 660 (holding owner had substantial property interest in
horses); Porter, 93 F.3d at 306–07 (holding owner had substantial property interest in
horses); McSwain, 2016 WL 4150036, at *4 (holding owner had substantial property
interest in high-step gait breeding horses); Daskalea, 480 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (holding
undisputed owner had protected property interest in dog purchased for companionship
and breeding); Temple, 163 F. Supp. 3d at 624 (holding owner had protected property
interest in incoming-generating cattle).
151
The Brief of the Appellee at 34, Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425 (8th Cir.
2019) (No. 18-3314); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see, e.g., Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of
New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978).
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sterilized, put up for adoption, or euthanized.152 Additionally, the value of
scanning an impounded animal for a microchip is incredibly high because
if the animal has a microchip, its owner can be immediately contacted to
retrieve the lost animal; thus, no significant deprivation occurs.153
According to a 2009 study, among the owners contacted about a lost pet,
approximately seventy-four percent wanted the animals returned.154
Third, requiring officials to scan impounded animals for a microchip,
where a microchip scanner is already readily available, does not put a
fiscal or administrative burden on the government.155 In fact, before the
present litigation, Kathy Botsford, Defendant in Lunon and director of
Pulaski County Animal Services, authorized the purchase of more microchip scanners so workers in the field could scan captured animals
immediately and take the animal directly to the owner.156 Most
municipalities have scanners readily available,157 most vets scan pets for
microchips,158 and universal microchip scanners can easily by purchased
online.159
Thus, the Majority’s failure to at the very least wholly analyze the
Mathews factors left its reasoning confusing and unpersuasive. The
precedent the Majority created is alarming. The Majority confirms due
process does not require an animal control officer to scan impounded pets
See Lunon, 946 F.3d at 427–28. In fact, “owners were found for 72.7 percent
of microchipped animals. Among those found, 73.9 percent of the owners wanted the
animals back in their homes.” Caldwell, supra note 5.
153
How
Does
Pet
Microchipping
Work?,
PETKEY,
https://petkey.org/public/howitworks.aspx [https://perma.cc/6EVQ-EQRK] (last
visited Sept. 23, 2021).
154
Caldwell, supra note 5.
155
See, e.g., Kate Coil, Memphis Animal Services, Fire Department team up to
help lost pets, TENN. MUN. LEAGUE, https://www.tml1.org/town-and-city/memphisanimal-services-fire-department-team-help-lost-pets [https://perma.cc/89HD-YQ9X]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2021); Animal Control receives grant for universal chip scanner,
SHIRLEY MASS. (June 26, 2019, 10:08 AM), https://www.shirley-ma.gov/animalcontrol/news/animal-control-receives-grant-universal-chip-scanner
[https://perma.cc/CX8B-AERZ]; What Our Grants Do, AKC REUNITE,
https://www.akcreunite.org/inaction/ [https://perma.cc/34YC-NU6V] (last visited
Apr. 1, 2021).
156
Linda Satter, Court overturns lost-dog ruling as federal judges reject central
Arkansas owner’s claim, ARK. DEMOCRAT GAZETTE (Dec. 29, 2019, 9:12 AM),
https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2019/dec/29/court-overturns-lost-dog-ruling2019122/ [https://perma.cc/KEX8-Z8DV].
157
See, e.g., supra note 155.
158
Microchipping
FAQ,
AM.
VETERINARY
MED.
ASS’N,
https://www.avma.org/microchipping-animals-faq
[https://perma.cc/VHZ9-83S4]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
159
See, e.g., Dog Microchip Scanners, LONG LIVE DOG,
https://longlivedog.com/dog-microchip-scanners/
[https://perma.cc/RN9V-63AU]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2021).
152
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for microchips even when the officer has a microchip scanner readily
available.160 For a system relying so heavily on checks and balances,
animal control officers seem unchecked under this decision.

B. The Unbridled Power of the State
The Lunon precedent is deeply concerning because it further
empowers the state to easily disrupt the property interests of both original
and adopted pet owners. Because animal control is a component of a state
government, permitted to exercise the state’s police power, pets may “be
destroyed or otherwise dealt with, as in the judgment of the legislature is
necessary for the protection of its citizens.”161 Accordingly, under certain
circumstances, government officials may shoot and kill a pet owner’s dog
if they are running at large,162 pose a threat,163 or even wounding sheep.164
In determining the lost pet’s fate, the law does not distinguish between the
reasons why a pet might be loose.165 Government officials may seize and
impound a stray animal, and after the proper holding period, potentially as
short as forty-eight hours, officials may adopt the animal out, sell it, or
even euthanize it.166 Most cities require animal control officials to notify
owners – identified from tags, microchips, or tattoos – that their pets have
been impounded.167 However, if officials do not find these identifiers or,
as in the present case, properly search for them, then no further action is
required to identify the owner.168 After the holding period and before
adoption, most states require facilities to spay or neuter pets.169 Some
160
Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 431 (8th Cir. 2019) (“But there is no
constitutional duty to scan a stray dog for a microchip . . . .”).
161
Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 209 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sentell v.
New Orleans & C.R. Co., 166 U.S. 698, 701–02 (1897)).
162
Altman v. City of High Point, 330 F.3d 194, 207 (4th Cir. 2003).
163
Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 2013) (reasonable jury
unlikely to find officer shooting allegedly aggressive dog unreasonable force); but see
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 218–19 (3d Cir. 2001) (court recognizes
reasonable jury could conclude officer shooting dog caused severe emotional distress
on owner).
164
MO. REV. STAT. § 273.030 (1939).
165
Rebecca F. Wisch, Detailed Discussion of State Dog Impound Laws, MICH.
ST.
U.
C.
L.
ANIMAL
LEGAL
&
HIST.
CTR.
(2003),
https://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussion-state-dog-impound-laws#id-2
[https://perma.cc/HP6T-K4TQ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
166
Rebecca F. Wisch & Ashley Dillingham, Table of State Holding Laws,
MICH. ST. U. C. L. ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR. (2017),
https://www.animallaw.info/topic/state-holding-period-laws-impounded-animals
[https://perma.cc/QR9X-Z4DZ] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021).
167
See, e.g., ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO., CODE § 611.090 (2005).
168
See, e.g., Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2019).
169
Wisch & Dillingham, supra note 166.
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states’ allow for the sale of pets to research facilities for experimental
purposes.170 Most alarming, as in the present case, government officials
seemingly face few repercussions for depriving a pet owner of their pet,
even when done in violation of local law.171
Beyond depriving a pet’s original owner of their property interest in
the animal, careless action on the part of state actors can also upset the
expectations of adopted pet owners.172 Here, Vance and his mother-in-law
presumed that Bibi belonged to them as their pet once her adoption was
final.173 In fact, most adopted pet owners understandably assume once
they adopt a pet, the pet becomes their property, protected under relevant
law.174 Ordinarily, this notion of absolute ownership holds.175 For
example, if a family adopts a dog from a shelter, and the shelter complied
with all laws regarding the pet’s transfer of title, then the former pet owner
likely cannot reclaim the pet as their own.176 As discussed above, the
government officials likely had the right to pick up the pet and put it up
for adoption after the original owner failed to claim the pet within the
designated holding period.177 However, if the involved government
officials violated the original pet owner’s rights, the adoption may be
invalidated, and the pet returned to the original owner by no fault of the
adopting family, as occurred in the present case.178 For example, an
170

See Kovar v. City of Cleveland, 102 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio Ct. App. 1951).
See, e.g., Lunon, 946 F.3d at 430.
172
See id. at 429, 946 F.3d at 429 (“Lunon recovered ownership of Bibi from
Vance in a state court replevin action.”).
173
See id. (“Lunon recovered ownership of Bibi from Vance in a state court
replevin action.”).
174
See, e.g., Sample Adoption Contract, FOREVER HOME RESCUE FOUND.,
https://www.aforeverhome.org/forms/sample-adoption-contract/
[https://perma.cc/PU75-3KKB] (last visited Apr. 12, 2021) (“[T]he dog, is being
transferred to the adopting owner with the understanding that the adopter is taking
possession of the dog to treat and to be responsible for it as their own dog… I
understand that by voluntarily signing this agreement, I am entering into a legal and
binding contract with A Forever Home Rescue Foundation. Breach of any term(s) of
this agreement is deemed actionable . . . .”).
175
See Lamare v. N. Country Animal League, 743 A.2d 598 (Vt. 1999); see
also Christopher A. Berry, Frequently Asked Questions on Lost Pets, MICH. STATE
UNIV. COLL. L. ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR., https://www.animallaw.info/intro/lostdogs#q5 [https://perma.cc/43H8-L2VU] (last visited Apr. 21, 2021).
176
See Lamare, 742 A.2d at 605; see also Frequently Asked Questions on Lost
Pets, supra note 175.
177
Frequently Asked Questions on Lost Pets, supra note 175.
178
Id.; see also Lunon v. Vance, et al., CV-17-3097 (Pulaski Cnty. Ark. Cir. Ct.
2017), rev’d sub nom. Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425 (8th Cir. 2019); Woods v.
Kittykind, Inc., 801 N.Y.S.2d 782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (unpublished table decision)
(court held defendant must disclose cat’s adopted owner’s information so plaintiff
may attempt to regain ownership of cat because defendant failed to sufficiently prove
proper procedure followed in adopting cat out).
171
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adoption might be invalidated if the shelter acquired the pet illegitimately,
did not make adequate efforts to find the owner, did not keep the pet for
the entire holding period or violated the pet owner’s constitutional
rights.179 The original owner may immediately regain ownership through
a replevin action, extinguishing the presumably stunned adopted pet
owner’s property interests.180 While Lunon was fortunate to have Bibi
returned to him, no doubt Vance and Lovell were also heartbroken and
surprised to have what they believed to be their new family pet taken away
from them.
Thus, pet owners – either original or adopted– may not realize how
little power they have concerning their property rights in their pet against
the state or because of the state’s actions.181 The court’s decision in Lunon
only adds to the State’s limitless power over pets.

C. The Policy Predicament
The Lunon Majority created an antagonistic policy predicament.
Municipalities and animal activist groups vehemently encourage or even
mandate that pet owners microchip their animals to increase the likelihood
and ease of returning the pet to its owner.182 But, the Majority’s dueprocess analysis lackadaisically concludes that even when a pet has a
microchip, officers who have a microchip scanner readily available need
not use it before potentially depriving a pet owner of their ownership
rights.183 This situation seems counterproductive. Pet owners and
municipalities enacting microchip legislation clearly rely on the

179

Frequently Asked Questions on Lost Pets, supra note 175.
See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 18-60-808(b) (2015) (plaintiff can establish
prima facie evidence that he/she has right to immediate possession of the property in
replevin action).
181
Supra notes 161–66. A similar situation is arising in the Chicago, Illinois
area. Kelly Davis, Woman suing shelter after lost dog put up for adoption, FOX 2 NOW
(Dec. 23, 2021), https://fox2now.com/news/woman-suing-animal-shelter-after-herlost-dog-was-put-up-foradoption/#:~:text=CHICAGO%20(WGN)%20%E2%80%94%20A%20Chicago,he%
20was%20just%20a%20puppy [https://perma.cc/9ZHN-2ZK2]. A young woman’s
dog, Zeus, was detained by Chicago animal enforcement and subsequently put up for
adoption. Id. Animal enforcement did not contact the young woman about Zeus even
though, as documented within intake papers, Zeus was wearing his collar with his
name and owner’s contact information sewn into the collar. Id. It will be interesting
to observe the legal battle between the former owner and new owner of Zeus — all
due to animal enforcement’s unchecked actions. Id.
182
See, e.g., Donovan, supra note 6; Gill, supra note 6; but see Stephen D. Lott,
Getting Under Fido’s Skin: Analyzing the Objections to Mandatory Pet
Microchipping Laws, 7 OKLA. J. L. & TECH. 52 (2011).
183
See, e.g., Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 430 (8th Cir. 2019); O'Keefe v.
Gist, 908 F. Supp. 2d 946, 953–54 (C.D. Ill. 2012).
180
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microchips actually being scanned for the legislation to achieve its
intended purpose.184 In this context, the Majority’s adamant references to
local Arkansas law and procedures are ironic because even the local Little
Rock government encourages pet owners to microchip dogs:
Your pet cannot talk. If he is lost, the only hope of identifying him is
his city dog license or a microchip. You should have a picture of your
pet, as well as a description including height, weight, age, color and
distinctive markings. These items will help us determine whether or
not your pet is in our care.185

Moreover, multiple cities in Arkansas mandate that owners
microchip their pets.186 For example, in 2012, Fayetteville required pet
owners to microchip their animals based on the opinion that microchips
are “highly regarded as a strategy for minimizing euthanasia in shelters
and returning animals home.”187 In 2019, Fort Smith required all cats and
dogs to be microchipped and licensed to, among other things, “ensure pets
could get home without being taken to a shelter.” 188 In 2010, Springdale
required all pet owners residing in city limits to microchip cats and dogs
and to register pets with the city’s animal services department.189
Most shelters adopting out pets, and even many local ordinances,
require microchips to be implanted before the pet leaves the facility.190
Additionally, even the policies not followed in the present case require
animal control officers to scan impounded animals for microchips.191
184

See, e.g., Animal Services Division, CITY OF LITTLE ROCK,
https://www.littlerock.gov/city-administration/city-departments/housing-andneighborhood/animal-services-division/ [https://perma.cc/LS2B-KS27] (last visited
Mar. 15, 2021).
185
See, e.g., id.
186
Infra notes 190–92.
187
Gill, supra note 6.
188
Brett Rains, What to know about Fort Smith’s new pet laws, 40/29 NEWS
(Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.4029tv.com/article/what-to-know-about-fort-smithsnew-pet-laws/28639811 [https://perma.cc/Q5WD-LEQ8].
189
Animal Services, SPRINGDALE, https://www.springdalear.gov/149/AnimalServices [https://perma.cc/3WMH-8L5Q] (last visited Mar. 15, 2021); see also LITTLE
ROCK, ARK., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 6, § 6-19(c)(3) (2009) (mandating microchips
for potentially dangerous breeds such as pit bulls as part of formal registration
requirements).
190
Dave Schlenker, Digging into mandatory pet microchipping, OCALA (Mar.
15, 2019), https://www.ocala.com/news/20190315/digging-into-mandatory-petmicrochipping [https://perma.cc/QKY4-D3GY] (“Animal shelters, including the
county Animal Center and Humane Society, already microchip dogs and cats before
they are released for adoption.”); see also JEFFERSON COUNTY, MO., CODE OF
ORDINANCES § 215.270 (2016).
191
See generally Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing
PULASKI COUNTY SANITATION AND ANIMAL SERVICES DEPT. PROCEDURE P14-06).
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Thus, the Lunon majority’s heavy reliance on government interests and
functions is counterintuitive considering the importance local
governments put on microchipping pets.192 The decision seems to give pet
owners little assurance that microchipping their pets will make it easier for
the government to return their lost dog. This lack of assurance may hurt
the government’s interest in microchipping pets. Pet owners may feel that
if there are no protections where an animal control officer does not scan
their lost pets for a microchip, even if a microchip scanner is readily
available, then the purported governmental purpose for microchipping is
not truly accurate.

D. A Lost Opportunity
Not only does the Majority in Lunon work against the government
interest in requiring pet owners to microchip their animals,193 but the
Majority fails to take the opportunity to modernize due process
jurisprudence concerning pets.194 The Arkansas cases the Majority cited
in Lunon were decided almost 100 years ago.195 As the Concurrence points
out, these cases were decided well before modern Due Process
jurisprudence developed to require the State to take certain steps before
depriving an individual of their protected property.196 According to Jones,
under Arkansas law, the State was only required to notify the property
owner “of his tax delinquency, and his right to redeem the property [after
paying the delinquent taxes], by mailing a certified letter” to the
individual. If the letter returned was unclaimed, the statute did not require
further notice.197 However, the court held the “State should have taken
additional reasonable steps to notify [the property owner], if practicable to
do so.”198 The court listed several alternate reasonable steps the State
could have taken, each of which would have been relatively easy and
would not have imposed a burden on the State.199 Here, Animal Control
Officers, at a minimum, must look for an identifying tag.200 Thus, due
192

Id. at 430.
Id. at 430.
194
Id.
195
See Howell v. Daughet, 230 S.W. 559 (Ark. 1921); Fort Smith v. Dodson,
46 Ark. 296 (1885).
196
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 433.
197
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 223–24 (2006).
198
Id. at 234.
199
Id. at 234–38.
200
ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-54-1102 (2019) (requiring municipalities to give
notice to impounded dog “where the dog carries its owner’s address); PULASKI
COUNTY, ARK., CODE OF ORDINANCES, ch. 3, art. II, § 3-19 (1981) (“When animal is
impounded, the director or his personnel shall give notice to the owner, if known, of
at least forty-eight (48) hours.”).
193
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process should also require, at a minimum, that if an Animal Control
Officer has a microchip scanner readily available, they should scan the pet
for a microchip because this requirement would not impose a burden on
the State. Notably, even PCAS policy requires Animal Control Officers
to scan for a microchip.201
Thus, as heeded by Jones, “[i]t is not too much to insist that the State
do a bit more” before “exerting extraordinary power against a property
owner.”202 Here, it is not too much to insist an animal control officer, with
a readily available microchip scanner, scan a stray animal for an
identifying microchip before potentially depriving a pet owner of their pet.
Similarly, it is not too much to insist that the court offer a morsel of
updated due process jurisprudence concerning pets in accordance with the
“State’s efforts to ensure that its citizens receive proper notice before the
state takes action against them” by encouraging pet owners to implant
microchips in their pets.203 The State is already making an effort to help
identify and return lost pets., The court’s missed opportunity to modernize
due process jurisprudence here may jeopardize these goals and leave room
for a situation like this to happen again; or worse, for a pet owner’s dog to
be euthanized.

VI. CONCLUSION
Pet owners may not realize how quickly their protected property
interest in their pets may be extinguished with seemingly little due process
of law. The precedent set in Lunon is alarming because it is so contrary to
the purposes underlying increasingly common local microchip
mandates.204 Cities and animal activist groups advise or require pet
owners to microchip their animals to quickly return the animal and
maintain safety in the community.205 However, the Majority in Lunon
decided to alleviate constitutional repercussions for those officers who do
not scan an impounded animal for a microchip, even when a microchip
scanner is readily available and a local ordinance requires that they do
so.206 If the government relies on pet owners to microchip their pets to
further public order, then pet owners should also be able to rely on the
government to scan the pets for the microchips they had to pay for in the
first place. Though the state has the undisputed police power to control
stray animals, it seems reasonable to conclude that before permanently

201
Lunon v. Botsford, 946 F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 2019 (citing PULASKI
COUNTY SANITATION AND ANIMAL SERVICES DEPT. PROCEDURE P14-06).
202
Jones, 547 U.S. at 239.
203
Id.; see also supra notes 170–90.
204
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 430.
205
Supra notes 184–90.
206
Lunon, 946 F.3d at 430.
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depriving an owner of their pet, an animal control officer must scan the
pet for a microchip if a scanner is readily available and it is safe to do so.
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